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1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant 
of Burglary. When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the 
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236 (Utah 1992); State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993) 
(citing State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992), cert, 
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985) quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 
1983) ). Reversal is appropriate "only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
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2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the 
jury as to what is required in terms of one's awareness of a crime 
prior to being convicted as a party to the crime of burglary. "A 
trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to 
the facts of the case." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 
1992) (citing State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981)). The 
challenge to a jury instruction as incorrectly stating the law 
presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993), cert, denied, 114 
S.Ct. 476 (1993); Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238 (citing Ramon v. Farr, 
770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989); Western Kane County Special Serv. 
Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987)); 
State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1993) . This issue was not 
raised before the trial court. For the reasons stated below, this 
issue presents circumstances constituting plain error and or 
exceptional or unusual circumstances. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 & n.3 (Utah 1993); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1311 (Utah 1987), on subsequent appeal, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991); State v. 
Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah App. 1996). 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and 
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out 
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of 
the instant brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By way of Amended Information, Defendant, Roger Wayne Van 
Cleave, was charged with Burglary, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, and Theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, to which Defendant 
pleaded not guilty. On January 4, 1994, Defendant appeared for a 
jury trial, after which Defendant was convicted as charged. The 
matter was then set for sentencing on January 25, 1994. 
On January 25, 1994, Defendant and appointed counsel, Glen T. 
Cella, appeared for sentencing. At sentencing, the trial court 
sentenced Defendant to imprisonment at the Utah State Prison for 1-15 
years. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about July 5, 1993, the Kjar home located in 
Centerville, Utah, was burglarized (R. 216-18, Jury Trial 
Transcript). 
2. At the time of the burglary, the Kjar family was away on a 
family vacation (R. 216, lines 11-16, Jury Trial Transcript). During 
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the burglary, someone took several items of personal property, 
including a Winchester Pump Rifle and case, a Yamaha twelve-string 
guitar, a three-quarter size six-string guitar, an amp speaker, and 
a music mixer (R. 225, 230, 167-74, Jury Trial Transcript). 
3. Defendant worked on a construction crew doing construction 
work at the Kjar home around the time of the burglary (R. 180-82; 
192-96, Jury Trial Transcript) . 
4. On or about the afternoon of July 5, 1993, Defendant pawned 
the Winchester Pump Rifle, Yamaha guitar, amp speaker, and music 
mixer (R. 222-30, Jury Trial Transcript) • On or about that same 
date, Defendant gave the three-quarter size guitar to his nephew as 
a gift (R. 247-49, Jury Trial Transcript). 
5. By way of Amended Information filed January 20, 1994, 
Defendant was charged with Burglary, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, and Theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, to which Defendant 
pleaded not guilty (R. 28, Amended Information). 
6. When the investigating officers first went to the Kjar 
residence, they made no effort to look for and collect fingerprints 
(R. 277, Jury Trial Transcript) . The investigating officers made no 
effort to obtain fingerprints from the personal property or Kjar 
residence at any time during the investigation or prior to trial (R. 
280, Jury Trial Transcript) . Finally, the investigating officers 
made no effort to preserve any physical evidence, i.e., fingerprints, 
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that might have existed on the personal property that was stolen from 
the Kjar residence (R. 282, Jury Trial Transcript). 
7. At the jury trial on January 19, 1994, Defendant contended 
that the property had been stolen from the Kjar home by another 
individual or friend, and that Defendant had only pawned the property 
without knowing that it had been stolen (R. 227, lines 14-20, 249-51, 
Jury Trial Transcript) . 
8. Jury Instruction No. 15, with which the trial court 
instructed the jury, states: 
Before you can convict the defendant, Roger 
Wayne VanCleave [sic], of the crime of burglary 
as charged in the Information on file in this 
case, you must believe from all of the evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every 
one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or before the 5th day of July, 
1993, in Davis County, State of Utah, a dwelling 
in Centerville was unlawfully entered; and 
2. Whoever entered that dwelling on that 
occasion did so with the intent to commit theft; 
and 
3. That Roger Wayne VanCleave [sic], 
defendant, was a party to the offense referred 
to in paragraphs one and two; and 
4. That said Roger Wayne Van Cleave [sic] 
acted intentionally or knowingly. 
If after careful consideration of all the 
evidence in this case, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of 
the foregoing elements, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If, on the other hand you 
are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty 
of burglary as charged in the Information on 
file in this case. 
(R. 58.) 
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9. Jury Instruction No. 18, with which the trial court 
instructed the jury, states: 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of burglary, who 
directly commits burglary, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally 
aides another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes burglary shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Roger 
Wayne VanCleave [sic], was a party to the 
burglary charged in the Information you may find 
him guilty even though you are not convinced 
that he personally entered the dwelling. 
(R. 62.) 
10. Jury Instruction No. 22, with which the jury was 
instructed, states: 
You are instructed that in every crime or 
public offense, there must be a union or joint 
operation of the act and intent. 
(R. 67.) 
11. Shortly after the jury began its deliberations, the trial 
court received the following note from the jury: "What does "party" 
mean in regards to when a person became aware of a crime? Is a 
person a "party" to burglary if they are aware of the crime after it 
was committed, or do they have to be aware of it before hand? Or 
during? Help" (R. 86) (emphasis included). 
12. Upon receiving the aforementioned note from the jury, the 
following exchange between the trial court and counsel took place: 
THE COURT: The record should note that we are 
in chambers with counsel in regards to the Van 
Cleave case. I have received a communication 
from the jury that asks this. "What does party 
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mean in regards to when a person became aware of 
a crime? Is a person a party to burglary if 
they are aware of the crime after it was 
committed or do they have to be aware of it 
beforehand or during?" And so maybe we ought to 
give them — send them in the aiding and 
abetting statute. I don't know how else to 
instruct them. 
MR. HARWARD: You know, it's kind of 
interesting. It tells me I do an inadequate job 
on that point because in my last trial two weeks 
ago with Judge Memmott there was a similar fact 
pattern and we got a similar question from the 
jury. What we did in that case is referred them 
to the instruction, but there is a question a 
little more specific now. 
THE COURT: The instructions won't cover this. 
MR. HARWARD: I think it's clear in the law that 
if he finds out after, he's not a party to the 
burglary. To be guilty of burglary, it has to 
be before or during. 
THE COURT: But if he aids and abets after, 
isn't he guilty of the same thing? 
MR. HARWARD: Except we don't have the old 
abetting statute. 
THE COURT: That's it, huh. 
MR. HARWARD: See, it used to have the concept, 
the accessory after the fact. 
THE COURT: We don't have that? 
MR. HARWARD: That is the party instruction and 
so he has to have the same state of mind. 
THE COURT: There has got to be a joint 
operation of act and intent, so we'll just refer 
them to that instruction. 
MR. HARWARD: Yes, that's correct. 
MR. CELLA: I think that's all we can do because 
we don't have anything after the fact like we 
used to. 
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MR. HARWARD: Sounds like they are struggling 
over the burglary think. 
THE COURT: I will send them in this 
instruction, you are instructed that in every 
crime or public offense — I think that's the 
key to it. All right? 
MR. HARWARD: All right. 
MR. CELLA: All right. 
MR. HARWARD: I agree. 
THE COURT: Here's what I'm saying. Jurors, 
please find attached a copy of one of the 
instructions which is a part of your jury 
instructions. Please review this along with 
your other instructions. This should answer 
your question. 
MR. HARWARD: I agree. 
THE COURT: Okay. Take this back into them. 
(R. 348-50, Jury Trial Transcript). 
13. The jury convicted Defendant, after which, on January 25, 
1994, Defendant was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 1 to 15 
years at the Utah State Prison on each count, with sentences to run 
concurrently both with each other and with a previous sentence being 
served at the time (R. 103, Judgment). 
14. Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on February 22, 1994 (R. 
97, Notice of Appeal). 
15. Judgment was entered on March 14, 1994 (R. 103, Judgment) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the 
conviction of Defendant as a party to the burglary of the Kjar 
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residence inasmuch as there is no evidence connecting Defendant to 
the entry of the home as a party or otherwise. There is no physical 
evidence connecting Defendant, as a party, to entering or remaining 
unlawfully in the Kjar residence. The State presented no evidence, 
that Defendant, as a party to the burglary, acted with the same 
mental state as the person who entered or remained unlawfully in the 
residence and solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionally aided the person in entering or unlawfully remaining in 
the Kjar residence with intent to commit theft. In fact, the State's 
own witness incontrovertibly testified that Defendant had told her 
that he did not burglarize the Kjar home but rather a friend had 
burglarized the home and then had asked Defendant to pawn the items 
for him as a favor, without Defendant knowing that the items had been 
stolen. As a result, the State failed to prove each element beyond 
a reasonable doubt, as it is required to do. 
Even when the evidence supporting the conviction of burglary is 
viewed is a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is 
insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of burglary as a 
party. Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is appropriate in 
the instant case because the evidence, even when so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
2. The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to 
what is required in terms of one's awareness of a crime prior to 
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being convicted as a party to the crime of burglary. Notwithstanding 
that this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, the 
consideration of this issue is wholly appropriate inasmuch as the 
trial court committed plain error and there are exceptional or 
unusual circumstances existing as a result of the and confusion 
created by the trial court's refusal and failure to property instruct 
the jury as to the requirements of Defendant's awareness prior to a 
conviction of Defendant as a party for the crime of burglary. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
THE CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT AS A PARTY TO THE BURGLARY 
OF THE KJAR RESIDENCE INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO EVIDENCE 
CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO THE ENTRY OF THE HOME AS A 
PARTY OR OTHERWISE. 
When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the 
appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992); 
State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. 
Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 
948 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is appropriate "only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App. 1992) 
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(quoting State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991), cert, 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)). 
This standard of applies even where much of the evidence is 
circumstantial. State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah App. 
1993) (citing State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) and State 
v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126-27 (Utah 1986)). As a matter of well-
settled law, "circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to 
establish the guilt of the accused." See Nickles, 728 P.2d at 126. 
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict "if it is of *such 
quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.'" Span, 819 P.2d at 332 (quoting Nickles, 728 
P.2d at 127) . However, the following standard applies when the 
evidence consists solely of undisputed, circumstantial evidence: 
[T]he role of the reviewing court is to 
determine (1) whether there is any evidence that 
supports each and every element of the crime 
charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can 
be drawn from that evidence have a basis in 
logic and reasonable human experience sufficient 
to prove each legal element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is 
not legally valid if it is based solely on 
inferences that give rise to only remote or 
speculative possibilities of guilt. 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993). 
Furthermore, when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, 
a "Md]efendant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that 
supports the verdict, and then showing that, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient.'" 
Hayes, 860 P.2d at 972 (quoting State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 793 
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(Utah App. 1992) cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)). In the 
instant case, Defendant must marshal all of the evidence in support 
of the verdict, including all circumstantial evidence, and then 
persuade the appellate court that, based upon this evidence, the 
State failed to prove that he was a party to the burglary of the Kjar 
residence. See State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 1991). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 defines burglary as follows: "A 
person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony 
or theft or commit an assault on any person." Section 76-2-202 
defines criminal liability as a party to a crime as follows: "Every 
person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of 
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as 
a party for such conduct." In other words, "[o]ne may be convicted 
as an accomplice if, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of the offense, he or she ^solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct 
which constitutes an offense.'" State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 84 (Utah 
App. 1990) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202). 
To convict Defendant of burglary, as a party, under the 
aforementioned statutes, the State had to prove that (1) on or about 
July 5, 1993, someone entered or unlawfully remained in the Kjar 
residence (2) with intent to commit a felony or theft, and that 
15 
Defendant (3) acted with the same mental state as the person who 
entered or unlawfully remained in the residence with intent to commit 
theft and (4) solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionally aided the person in entering or unlawfully remaining in 
the Kjar residence with intent to commit theft. The State, as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-1-501,1 had the burden to prove each 
of the aforementioned elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The following is the evidence that supports the jury's verdict 
that Defendant was a party to the burglary of the Kjar home: (1) 
Defendant worked on the construction crew doing construction work at 
the Kjar home around the time of the burglary (R. 180-82; 192-96, 
Jury Trial Transcript); (2) during the course of performing 
construction work on the Kjar home, there was a discussion in the 
presence of Defendant about the Kjar family leaving to go on vacation 
(R. 182, Jury Trial Transcript) ; (3) on or about the afternoon of 
July 5, 1993, Defendant pawned a Winchester Pump Rifle, Yamaha 
guitar, amp speaker, and music mixer (R. 222-30, Jury Trial 
xUtah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of 
the offense charged against him is proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, 
the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "elements 
of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden 
in the definition of the offense; or 
(b) The culpable mental state 
required. 
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Transcript), which, according to testimony at trial, were identified 
as items that had been taken from the Kjar residence in the course of 
the burglary; (4) on or about that same date, Defendant gave a three-
quarter size guitar to his nephew as a gift (R. 247-49, Jury Trial 
Transcript), which, according to testimony at trial, was identified 
as one of the guitars that had been taken from the Kjar residence; 
(5) on July 5, 1993, Defendant paid his sister-in-law, Lisa Van 
Cleave, $100 toward monies owed to her by Defendant (R. 248, 324, 
Jury Trial Transcript). 
In the instant case, there is no physical evidence, whatsoever, 
connecting Defendant, as a party, to entering or remaining unlawfully 
in the Kjar residence.2 Further, the State presented no evidence, 
whatsoever, that Defendant, as a party to the burglary, acted with 
the same mental state as the person who entered or remained 
unlawfully in the residence and solicited, requested, commanded, 
encouraged, or intentionally aided the person in entering or 
unlawfully remaining in the Kjar residence with intent to commit 
theft. See In re J.M.H., 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23-24 (Utah App. 
1996) (holding that where defendant first learned of burglary after 
its completion he could not possess the mental state necessary to 
commit the burglary, and therefore cannot be held liable as an 
Especially troubling, is the total lack of effort by the 
investigating officers in the instant case to attempt to obtain 
fingerprints or to preserve any physical evidence during the course 
of the investigation (R. 280-82, Jury Trial Transcript) . This 
failure precluded Defendant from obtaining potentially exculpatory 
evidence that might have tended to show his innocence. 
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accomplice under § 76-6-202). In fact, the State's own witness, Lisa 
Van Cleave, incontrovertibly testified that Defendant had told her 
that he did not burglarize the Kjar home but rather a friend had 
burglarized the home and then had asked Defendant to pawn the items 
for him as a favor, without Defendant knowing that the items had been 
stolen (R. 251-52, 249, Jury Trial Transcript) . As a result, the 
State failed to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, as it 
is required to do. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501. 
Even when the evidence supporting the conviction of burglary, as 
set forth above pursuant to the marshaling requirement, is viewed is 
a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is insufficient to 
support Defendant's conviction of burglary as a party. Reversal for 
insufficiency of the evidence is appropriate in the instant case 
because the evidence, even when so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted. That reasonable doubt was entertained is 
evidenced by the jury's written communication with the trial court 
shortly after the jury began its deliberations. The note from the 
jury stated, "What does *party' mean in regards to when a person 
became aware of a crime? Is a person a "party" to burglary if they 
are aware of the crime after it was committed, or do they have to be 
aware of it before hand? Or during? Help" (R. 86) (emphasis 
included) . 
18 
In the instant case, the State's case hinges on the inferences 
to be drawn from Defendant's close proximity to the Kjar residence by 
way of his construction work at the Kjar home around the time of the 
burglary, and that Defendant, shortly after the burglary, pawned a 
portion of the stolen property.3 These events, taken together with 
the other evidence marshaled above, establish no probative inference 
that Defendant, as a party to the burglary, acted with the same 
mental state as the person who entered or remained unlawfully in the 
residence and solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionally aided the person in entering or unlawfully remaining in 
the Kjar residence with intent to commit theft. Even when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the State's evidence 
simply does not support a reasonable inference that Defendant had the 
mental state or conduct required by statute for conviction of 
burglary as a party. "Criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture 
or supposition; they must be established by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt." See Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah 1993) (noting that the 
State's argument that "speculative inferences can constitute proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is to attack one of the most sacred 
constitutional safeguards at its core"). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
AS TO WHAT IS REQUIRED IN TERMS OF ONE'S AWARENESS OF 
3Cf. State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 1986) (holding 
that "[t]he mere possession of stolen property unexplained by the 
person in charge thereof is not in and of itself sufficient to 
justify a conviction of larceny of the property . . . . " ) 
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A CRIME PRIOR TO BEING CONVICTED AS A PARTY TO THE 
CRIME OF BURGLARY. 
"A trial court has' a duty to instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the facts of the case." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 
232, 238 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 
1981)). "Jury instructions must be read and evaluated as a whole. " 
State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. 
Johnson, 114 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989)). The jury instructions 
must accurately and adequately inform a criminal jury as to the basic 
elements of the crime as charged. Id. (citing State v. itoberts, 711 
P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985)). "However, if taken as a whole they 
fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case, the fact 
that one of the instructions, standing alone, is not as accurate as 
it might have been is not reversible error." Id. (citing State v. 
Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 
461, 470 (Utah App. 1993)). 
The challenge to a jury instruction as incorrectly stating the 
law presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993), cert, denied, 
114 S.Ct. 476 (1993); Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238 (citing Ramon v. 
Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989); Western Kane County Special 
Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 
1987)); Lucero, 866 P.2d at 3. 
This jury instruction issue in the instant appeal is raised for 
the first time on appeal. Ordinarily, the failure to raise an issue 
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before the trial court precludes consideration of the issue on 
appeal. State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994). 
There are, however, two limited but well-established exceptions to 
this general rule. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 
1991). The appellate court may address an issue for the first time 
on appeal if the trial court committed plain error or there are 
exceptional circumstances. Id. 
In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme 
Court outlined the following principles involved in determining 
whether "plain error'7 exists: 
In general, to establish the existence of plain 
error and to obtain appellate relief from an 
alleged error that was not properly objected to, 
the appellant must show the following: (i) An 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error 
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined. 
Id. at 1208-09; see also State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah 
App. 1996); and State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App. 1996). 
According to State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989), "in 
most circumstances, the term ^manifest injustice' [found in Utah R. 
Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the ^plain error' standard 
expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d). . . ." 
The second exception is the catch-all device requiring 
"exceptional" or "unusual" circumstances. Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 
923. This exception acts as a safety device "to make certain that 
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manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an 
issue on appeal." Id. According to Dunn, the exceptional 
circumstances exception applies primarily to rare procedural 
anomalies. . . ." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n.3 (citing Archambeau, 82 0 
P.2d at 922-26). 
As to the plain error exception in the instant case, the trial 
court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury as to 
what is required in terms of one's awareness of a crime prior to 
being convicted as a party to the crime of burglary. The trial court 
utilized the following jury instructions to instruct the jury as to 
the elements of burglary and the definition of party liability for a 
criminal act of another: 
Instruction No. 15 
Before you can convict the defendant, Roger 
Wayne VanCleave [sic], of the crime of burglary 
as charged in the Information on file in this 
case, you must believe from all of the evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every 
one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or before the 5th day of July, 
1993, in Davis County, State of Utah, a dwelling 
in Centerville was unlawfully entered; and 
2. Whoever entered that dwelling on that 
occasion did so with the intent to commit theft; 
and 
3. That Roger Wayne VanCleave [sic], 
defendant, was a party to the offense referred 
to in paragraphs one and two; and 
4. That said Roger Wayne Van Cleave [sic] 
acted intentionally or knowingly. 
If after careful consideration of all the 
evidence in this case, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of 
the foregoing elements, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If, on the other hand you 
are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
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of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty 
of burglary as charged in the Information on 
file in this case. 
(R. 58.); 
Instruction No. 18 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of burglary, who 
directly commits burglary, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally 
aides another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes burglary shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Roger 
Wayne VanCleave [sic], was a party to the 
burglary charged in the Information you may find 
him guilty even though you are not convinced 
that he personally entered the dwelling. 
(R. 62.); 
Instruction No. 22 
You are instructed that in every crime or 
public offense, there must be a union or joint 
operation of the act and intent. 
(R. 67.) . 
Shortly after the jury began its deliberations, the trial court 
received the following note from the jury: "What does "party" mean 
in regards to when a person became aware of a crime? Is a person a 
"party" to burglary if they are aware of the crime after it was 
committed, or do they have to be aware of it before hand? Or during? 
Help" (R. 86) (emphasis included). As evidenced by the in-chambers 
exchange between the trial court and counsel, the trial court was 
obviously aware, as a result of the jury's note, that further 
instruction was necessary concerning the jury's question concerning 
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awareness of the crime of burglary in order for Defendant to be 
convicted as a party of burglary (See R. 348-50, Jury Trial 
Transcript and Statement of Fact #12 above) . In fact, the trial 
court initially recognized, during the in-chambers discussion, that 
the jury instructions, as constituted, were inadequate (R. 349, line 
3, Jury Trial Transcript) . Further, in the course of the in-chambers 
conference, the prosecution stated, "I think it's clear in the law 
that if [Defendant] finds out after, he's not a party to the 
burglary. To be guilty of burglary, it has to be before or during." 
(R. 349, lines 4-6, Jury Trial Transcript). Instead of instructing 
the jury that a person has to be aware of the burglary before or 
during the burglary in order to be a party, the trial court merely 
referred them to a copy of Instruction No. 22, instructing the jury 
that "in every crime or public offense, there must be a union or 
joint operation of the act and intent." By so doing, the trial court 
erred by failing to accurately and adequately inform the jury as to 
the basic elements of criminal responsibility as a party to the crime 
of burglary. Moreover, the jury instructions, when taken as a whole, 
failed to fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case 
in terms of the elements of party liability and the crime of 
burglary. The trial court's error is especially egregious in light 
of the jury's clear request for further instruction concerning 
awareness of the crime of burglary. 
The failure of the trial court to accurately instruct the jury 
affected the substantial rights of Defendant by failing to insure 
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that received his constitutional right to a fair trial. As a result, 
the trial court's errors were harmful because such errors undermine 
any confidence this Court might have that Defendant received a fair 
trial. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1201; Portillo, 914 P.2d at 726. 
In addition to plain error, the instant case presents 
exceptional or unusual circumstances. As evidenced by the in-
chambers exchange about the jury's request for further instruction 
about party liability, there existed significant confusion about the 
nature of party liability in terms of the party liability statute. 
The trial court, at that particular point, had a duty to clarify the 
law of party liability as it pertained facts of the case as inquired 
about by the jury in its note.to the court. Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 
238. To not consider and correct this matter on appeal would result 
in a great and manifest injustice or harm by failing to protect the 
constitutional right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse Defendant's conviction of burglary and remand the case 
for a new trial with instructions to correct the errors committed in 
the course of the jury trial. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant 
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issues in the instant appeal dealing with the sufficiency of evidence 
principles, circumstantial evidence, and what is required for 
conviction as a party to a crime, which are matters of continuing 
public interest and which involve issues requiring further 
development in the area of criminal law case development. Counsel 
for Defendant further requests that the method of disposition of the 
instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official 
Publication" for purposes of precedential value and instruction in 
future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IfctT) day of October, 1996. 
/^ R^lfoLD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
"ST2e4^ t-i/ Wi^g^s 
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